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collection of definable concepts and the collection of objects are immaterial.
The only cardinality restriction is that the size of the collection of definable
concepts is no greater than the size of the language (at most countably many
in the case of a countable language). This restriction follows not from the
diagonalization argument but from what it is to be a definable concept.
Definable Basic Law V, which forces ^ to be injective only on the definable
concepts, vividly demonstrates the fact that Russell’s Paradox applies even if
the collection of definable concepts is of the same size or even smaller than
the collection of objects.8
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Dispositions and the principle of least action
revisited
BENJAMIN T. H. SMART AND KARIM P. Y. THE´BAULT
1. Introduction
Some time ago, Joel Katzav (2004, 2005) and Brian Ellis (2005) debated the
compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action.
8 Thanks to Raffael Singer, two referees, and especially Richard Heck for comments.
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Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since,1 even by the most
naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis
arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist
identified by Katzav in his 2004 (we call these the ‘contingent action-quan-
tities’ and ‘explanatory’ objections), and claim they are not as problematic
for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons
espoused by Ellis.
2. Dispositional essentialism
Dispositional essentialism is the view that at least some properties have a
dispositional essence. Dispositions are natural properties conferring ‘powers’
on the objects that instantiate them, which manifest when the relevant stimu-
lus conditions are met. For example, salt has the disposition ‘solubility’: the
power to dissolve when placed in water; thus, when one submerges a grain of
salt in water, its disposition to dissolve manifests, forming a saline solution.
Dispositional essentialists believe that all explainable change occurs in virtue
of dispositional properties2 – indeed, all physical changes just are the mani-
festation of dispositions.3 In short (at least insofar as Katzav, Ellis and we use
the term in this debate), dispositions are fundamental natural properties that
explain all physical change.
3. Least action principles
The laws of physics can be divided into two categories: first there are the
instantaneous laws, most of which all students with a rudimentary under-
standing of physics are familiar with (these include the Newton’s law of
gravitation, Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism and the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion in quantum mechanics). If one knows the state of the system at a given
time t, one can apply the instantaneous laws and predict the state of the
system at tþ 1. Then there are the least action principles. These are the fun-
damental meta-laws underlying an atemporal nomology; they state that for
any given physical system, and any specified initial and final conditions, that
1 Alexander Bird briefly mentions least action principles as reason to doubt dispositional
essentialism (2007: 214–5) in response to one of the objections presented in this article,
but he devotes only half a page to the matter, and there are several other objections that
Bird does not consider. These additional objections are also addressed in this article. We
also reply to objections to dispositional essentialism that Ellis does not adequately deal
with in his reply to Katzav, and reply to one possible objection not identified by Katzav in
his original article.
2 Only explainable change, since as Handfield (2001) has argued, dispositional essentialism
is compatible with ‘space-invaders’, which spontaneously pop into existence for no reason.
3 Proponents of dispositional essentialism include Shoemaker (1998), Bird (2007), Mumford
(2004), Heil (2012) and Tugby (2013).
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system will evolve through the sequence of states that minimize, or more
accurately, extremize, a quantity called ‘action’.4
Generally, action principles are expressed in terms of a Lagrangian formu-
lation. For each physical system one can uniquely specify a function called
the ‘Lagrangian’. This function is determined by the nature of the physical
system in question; that is, the properties and forces inherent in it. It applies,
in one form or another, to all physical theories including general and special
relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and even string theory.5
In the case of a Newtonian Mechanical system, for example, the Lagragian
L is simply given by the kinetic energy of the system T minus the potential
energy of the system V. Once the Lagrangian is known, the action associated
with a physical system passing through a sequence of states can be defined by
integrating the Lagrangian over the sequence of states. The actual sequence of
states, then, is that which extremizes action. Importantly, given the
Lagrangian and the principle of least action, all the instantaneous laws
applicable to the system in question can be derived.6
4. Katzav’s ‘contingent action-quantities’ objection
One can define the action of any possible sequence of states between two
states of a physical system (we call these the initial and final states), and in
general there are many – the principle of least action tells us which of the
possible sequences the system follows. Katzav explicitly states that this prin-
ciple presupposes that the ‘action of any given physical system could have
taken various values, and thus that any such system could have been correctly
described by different equations of motion’ (Katzav 2004: 210); the sequence
of states the system instantiates, and hence the instantaneous laws of motion,
must (according to Katzav) be contingent.
In considering the dispositionalist metaphysic outlined earlier, one can see
that whereas some take a property’s identity to be fixed primitively by a
‘quiddity’, dispositional essentialists take properties to be identified purely
by the causal role they play (if F is the property ‘solubility’, then in all
4 For more details on the historical, philosophical and formal foundations of action prin-
ciples see Sto¨ltzner (1994, 2003, 2009).
5 In the context of quantum theories, the connection to the Lagrangian and principle of least
action is via the path integral formulation. This can be seen most clearly by considering the
second postulate in the original derivation by Feynman (1948), wherein the quantum
amplitude is assumed to be peaked upon the least action path.
6 More precisely, the PLA allows us to derive the Euler-Lagrange equations that in turn
provide us with the equations of motion for any given Lagrangian. There are some rather
technical subtleties that mean, strictly speaking, full mathematical equivalence with the
instantaneous laws does not obtain. Rather, given these issues, it is only under the addition
of certain formal sufficiency conditions that we can establish a rigorous proof of equiva-
lence. See Brechtken-Manderscheid (1991: S6).
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possible worlds, objects instantiating F will dissolve when placed in water). If
the version of dispositional essentialism assumed by Katzav is correct, and
dispositions are the only explanantia for physical change, then given the
initial and final states of a physical system (i.e. the pattern of property in-
stantiations at the specified times) there is only one possible quantity of
action, and hence just one possible sequence of states that the system can
follow. The laws of motion, for the dispositional essentialist, are thus neces-
sary, and so according to Katzav’s criterion dispositional essentialism is in-
compatible with the principle of least action.
4.1 Response 1. Scientific essentialism
Ellis responds to the contingent action-quantities objection by drawing a
distinction between ‘naı¨ve’ and ‘sophisticated’ forms of dispositional essen-
tialism (Ellis calls this view ‘Scientific Essentialism’ – see (Ellis 2005: 90)); he
concedes that Katzav’s objection may hold some weight against the naı¨ve
conception Katzav assumes – that dispositions are the most fundamental
natural properties, and these fundamental properties are the only real explan-
ation for physical change) – but insists that the sophisticated dispositional
essentialist’s complex hierarchy of natural kinds adequately accommodates
the principle of least action.
According to Ellis’s ‘sophisticated’ scientific essentialism, there are several
natural kind hierarchies: natural kinds of substances, natural kinds of pro-
cesses/events and natural kinds of properties (for Ellis, these are tropes7) – to
each of these natural kinds, essential properties are ascribed; that is, proper-
ties without which no substance/process/property could be a member of
the natural kind in question. Laws of nature, says Ellis, describe the
essential properties of natural kinds, and these laws have explanatory
value (Ellis 2001).
Ellis suggests that the property ‘Lagrangianism’ is a ‘truly universal prop-
erty – one that is possessed by every object in the universe’ (Ellis 2005: 91),
and further, that given our empirical observations, it is reasonable to suppose
this property is of the essence of all physical systems.8 The explanation for
why physical systems are all Lagrangian, then, is simply that Lagrangianism
is of the essence of physical systems; in other words, it is a law of nature that
physical systems have extremized quantities of action.
7 See Ellis 2001.
8 The nature of the ‘Lagrangian’ property is never made particularly clear. Ellis writes that
‘every continuing object must be Lagrangian, that is be disposed to evolve in accordance
with the principle of least action’ (2005: 91), so one must assume he takes the property to
be dispositional in character. However, Ellis’s view is that the PLA is a law, and further
that it is not causal. Is Ellis supposing, then, that there are non-causal dispositions? Given
the nature of, and motivation for the literature on dispositional properties, this strikes as
odd, but not necessarily implausible.
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This explanation for the principle of least action being true of the actual
world, just like Katzav’s, is nomic rather than causal – there are no stimulus
conditions necessary for least action principles to kick in, for they are atem-
poral. But that is not to say the principle of least action is incompatible with
dispositional essentialism – it can still be the case that substances instantiate
fundamental dispositional properties, and that these dispositions manifest
when their stimulus conditions are met. Ellis’s view requires only that there
is a particular ‘global law’ that ensures all physical systems do, in fact, adhere
to the least action principles.
Unsurprisingly, this is wholly unsatisfactory for Katzav. The action-
quantities are still not contingent. If anything, the situation is worse.
Scientific essentialism is committed to the a posteriori necessity of action
being extremized – it is of the essence of physical systems.
4.2 Response 2. Contingent sequence of states? whatever do you mean?
Ellis’s argument rests on the strength of global kind explanations – that
F being of the essence of the global kind is a good explanation for members
of the global kind (including the actual world) having the property F. This
seems somewhat ad hoc, for the question ‘why is F of the essence of the
global kind?’ arises. It is true that explanations must end somewhere, of
course, and further that for the Scientific Essentialist there is nowhere else
to go, but nonetheless, we (and others (see Bird 2007: 213)) find Ellis’s
response somewhat unsatisfying. However, Katzav’s argument is dubious
nonetheless.
Alexander Bird questions in what sense the quantity of action being extre-
mized must be contingent. If metaphysical contingency is genuinely required,
then Katzav’s objection holds, as on Ellis’s view there are no two metaphys-
ically possible systems with identical initial and final states, which differ in
their quantities of action. But does the principle of least action really require
metaphysical contingency? If logical contingency is insufficient, then the
burden of proof is on Katzav to show this, and there is no obvious reason
why it should not be. Given that the dispositional essentialist can happily
endorse the logical contingency of the quantities of action of any physical
system, Katzav’s argument is diffused9 (Bird 2007: 214).
9 A world is logically possible only if a complete description of that world contains no
contradictions. Metaphysical possibility, however, rests on the nature of particulars and
their properties. To borrow Saul Kripke’s (1980) example, water is H2O. Stating that
water is not H2O involves no logical contradiction, but it is nonetheless metaphysically
impossible for water not to be H2O, since anything that is not H2O is not water. Similarly,
if dispositional essentialism is true, then (assuming no interfering factors) it is metaphys-
ically necessary for dispositional properties to manifest when their stimulus conditions are
met, but it is not logically necessary, since one can describe these situations without logical
contradiction.
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Katzav will no doubt respond that when we conceive of a physical system
violating least action principles, it really is our kind of physical system that
we are imagining (since if, as many argue, conceivability is a good guide to
possibility,10 then the domains of metaphysical and logical possibility are the
same). Ellis will counter, however, that Katzav is simply misled by the fact
that the physical systems he is conceiving look similar to the physical systems
we observe. Katzav is conceiving of a world with a different kind-member-
ship to the actual world, since the two worlds have different essential
properties.11
5. The first explanatory objection
Katzav claims that the principle of least action affords important explan-
ations incompatible with dispositional essentialism. He argues the fact that,
in reality, action always takes the extremized possible value should lead us to
believe that the principle of least action is no accident; further, that if it is no
accident, then we can appeal to it in explanation.
As mentioned, given the formulation of a system’s action integral
(the Lagrangian) and the principle of least action, one can derive the instant-
aneous laws; the principle of least action, then, arguably explains why the
objects comprising the system move in accordance with the laws of motion
(Katzav, 2004: 211). These laws, he claims, in turn explain the dispositions of
those objects. The dispositional essentialist conception assumed by Katzav,
on the other hand, takes dispositional properties to be the ultimate expla-
nantia. If dispositions are the ultimate explanantia, then clearly the principle
of least action cannot be that which explains the dispositions, and so on the
face of it, the explanation afforded by the principle of least action is incom-
patible with dispositionalism (211). We should therefore reject dispositional
essentialism.
Of course, here the question ‘which is the better explanation?’ arises.
Consider the case of Newtonian Mechanics not only can the instantaneous
laws of motion be derived from the principle of least action, but given the
instantaneous laws of motion, one can derive the principle of least action
(212) – if Katzav can claim the principle of least action explains the dispos-
itions, the dispositional essentialist can claim the dispositions of objects
explain the principle of least action. Katzav acknowledges that this kind of
response can be raised, but states that ‘the fact that physicists typically use the
principle of least action (PLAC)12 to deduce the corresponding equations of
motion and not vice versa illustrates, the explanation only proceeds from the
10 See Chalmers 2002 for a comprehensive discussion.
11 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
12 PLAC – the principle of least action as used in classical particle mechanics.
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PLAC to the equations of motion’ (213). We deem this unconvincing for the
reasons expressed later.
5.1 Response to the first explanatory problem
That there are close relationships between our concepts of explanation, meta-
physics and scientific practice is obvious, but clearly we cannot hope to un-
tangle the intricacies in this short article. However, it is worth outlining a
few, crude observations. Some philosophers (see Lewis 1986: 214) deem all
explanations to be causal, that to provide an explanation for some event is to
provide some information about its causal history; some admit of nomo-
logical explanations (see Hempel 1965; Salmon 1971); and some are even
willing to grant that mere regularities, without any causal or nomological
connotations, can have explanatory value (Smart 2013). The governing laws
and dispositionalist metaphysics both invoke some form of ‘necessary con-
nection’ in their explanations of physical change, and this comes not from
current scientific practice, but from the mind-independent nature of the uni-
verse. For metaphysicians, the real explanantia for physical change should be
taken to be mind-independent.
As Katzav rightly points out, deduction and explanation are not the same,
but that scientists tend to move from the principle of least action to derive
dispositions and not vice versa has no bearing on what is the real explanation
of what sequences of states are taken by physical systems. This depends on
the nature of the universe: does the principle of least action guide physical
systems such that action is extremized, or do the fundamental dispositions of
objects have a modal character that determines the extremized quantities of
action inherent to all physical systems? The answer to this question may be
hidden from us (hopefully not – as this is the focus of much endeavour in
metaphysics), but Katzav’s apparent motivation for choosing the principle of
least action as the explanans is far from convincing.
Moreover, the fact that, in the context of classical particle mechanics, sci-
entists often find it easier to work from action principles to equations of
motion is not sufficient to warrant a general thesis about explanatory priority.
Consider the case of the discovery of the field equations of general relativity
(Renn 2007). Although the derivation of Hilbert did largely proceed along
such a route, Einstein (who has historical precedence) found the equations
that bear his name by following a different chain of reasoning. What is
more, in the contemporary context, some of the most perspicuous explanations
of why the field equations take the form they do (Lovelock 1971) use sym-
metry and uniqueness arguments, not action principles, as their basis.
6. The second explanatory objection
Katzav states that the principle of least action is no accident (2004: 212).
There are lots of logically possible quantities of action for every physical
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system, but only one physically possible one – that which extremizes action.
But why is this? Why could the dispositions not have been such that it was
metaphysically necessary for the quantities action to take other values? On
the face of it, one is left with a cosmic coincidence, unless one takes the
‘principle of least action’ itself to be a governing law, ensuring that physical
systems have extremized quantities of action.
6.1 Response to the second explanatory problem
The dispositional essentialist’s ontology cannot accommodate the ‘governing
principle of least action’ response, but we do not take this to be problematic.
Dispositional essentialism, ex hypothesi, is the thesis that dispositions are the
most fundamental units – the most fundamental explanantia. One cannot
ask, however, why we have the natural kinds (and hence the dispositions
that are essential to them) that we do – these are questions to which the
dispositional essentialist must deny there are answers. That action is extre-
mized is indeed no coincidence; it flows from the dispositional properties
inherent to the actual world.
7. The third explanatory objection13
Given that one can only explain the dispositions instantiated by any one
object by appeal to the manifestation of properties at earlier times and that
the laws of nature are determined by the dispositions of objects (as dispos-
itions are fundamental), then any explanation for objects moving in accord-
ance with the laws of motion must be a historical one. Least action principles,
on the other hand, are by their nature atemporal, so this rather unappealing
consequence is not encountered; one should therefore prefer least action
principle explanations.
7.1 Response to the third explanatory problem
There are different forms of dispositional essentialism. Ellis has mentioned
‘naı¨ve’ and ‘sophisticated’ dispositionalism, and suggested that Katzav’s art-
icle is (unbeknownst to him) directed purely at the naı¨ve dispositionalist, that
is, the dispositional essentialist who does not claim that laws are essential
properties of natural kinds. Here, we focus on one of the ‘naı¨ve’ disposition-
alist ontologies – dispositional monism (Bird 2007; Mumford 2004).
There is, of course, a strong sense in which the dispositions an object
possesses are determined causally. Causation involves the ‘passing around
of powers’ (Mumford 2009) – for example, when billiard ball a hits billiard
ball b, a loses momentum and the stationary ball b gains the power to move
other billiard balls, as b now has momentum. However, that is not to say the
13 To our knowledge this has not been raised by Katzav, but it should be addressed as a
potential objection nonetheless.
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dispositional monist cannot provide an atemporal explanation for action
being extremized.
Bird’s form of dispositional monism asserts that all properties are univer-
sals, and that all natural properties have a dispositional essence. The view
relies on an entire framework of universals, such that the nature of every
property is fixed by its place in a network of natural properties, connected by
second-order universals (relations between the natural properties). The causal
role of a fundamental property, then, is determined by the stimulus and
manifestation relations (the second-order properties) it bears to other natural
properties. Prima facie this leads to an infinite regress, but due to the asym-
metric nature of the network of relations, this is not the case.14 Given that the
identity of any one property is wholly determined by its place in a network of
universals, for that one property to exist at all, the structure of the network
must be precisely as it is.
The network determining the nature of the natural properties does not
exist in virtue of the history of the universe – its structure is very much
atemporal.15 For the dispositional essentialist, this network of properties
not only entails the Lagrangian but also guarantees that objects behave in
accordance with the instantaneous laws; that is, the laws of motion.
8. Conclusion
Katzav attempts to undermine dispositional essentialism by arguing for its
incompatibility with one of our most fundamental physical principles. Ellis
responds by espousing a more sophisticated conception of the thesis, which
he believes saves dispositional essentialism from Katzav’s objections; as we
have shown, this response succeeds only if one takes the principle of least
action to assume only the logical contingency of physical systems’ quantities
of action. However, as we see no reason to think the principle should assume
a more liberal metaphysical possibility, we dismiss Katzav’s objections
accordingly. We considered several further explanatory objections, but dem-
onstrate that none of these are irresolvable for the dispositionalist. We do not
claim, in this short article, to have demonstrated beyond doubt that disposi-
tionalist ontologies are unthreatened by least action principles, but further
argument is certainly required if one is to reject a ‘powers’ metaphysic on
these grounds.16
14 See Bird 2007; Tugby 2013.
15 See Tugby 2013 for a good discussion of platonic dispositions.
16 We thank Michael Talibard, Alastair Wilson, Nick Jones and an anonymous referee for
their helpful feedback and criticism. K.P.Y.T. would also like to thank the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation for financial support.
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